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The Resurrection of a Beneficiary
LAWRENCE C. ARNOLD*

In their desire to avoid the lapse of testamentary dispositions
made to the issue of a testator the Imperial legislators in the year
1837' made provisions whereby if any real or personal estate were
left to a child or other issue of the testator, and such issue died
during the lifetime of the testator, leaving issue surviving the testator, then the gift did not lapse but took effect as if the object of the
testator's bounty had died immediately after the testator. The common law as to the effect of a testamentary donee predeceasing the
testator is succinctly stated in the English case of Re Greenwood2
where Parker J. states:
In construing a gift of this nature it must be remembered that the
general law does not allow a legatee who predeceases the testator to
take any benefit under his will. In that event the gift is said to lapse,
with the consequence that it falls into residue, or, if it is itself a share

of residue, goes to the testator's next-of-kin...
The mischief intended to be removed by the provision of the Wills
Act 3 was solely this provision of the "General Law" and yet from
time to time the courts have seen fit to construe the intention of the
legislature so as to extend that apparent intention. In so doing
they have held that the section 4 postpones the death of the predeceasing "child or other issue" for all purposes relevant to the
disposition of the gift made to such "child or other issue". 5 This
state of affairs has been corrected by a shaft of judicial light contained in one of the more flagrant examples of breach of the so called
"doctrine of binding precedent" which will be examined later in this
6
article.
Section XXXI of the Imperial statute was embodied in the
wills legislation of the law of Ontario in basically similar form to the
original legislation, and until 19597 had retained its original substance, but had given birth to an additional member of the family
by its extension to embrace gifts left away to brothers and sisters
of the testator. The law as embodied in section 36 of the Ontario
Wills Act prior to 1959 provided: 8
* Mr. Arnold is a barrister at law of Gray's Inn and a Bachelor of Law of

the University of London. He is at present in the third year at Osgoode Hall
Law School.
I See. XXXIII, 1 Vict. 26 (Imp.).
2 [1912] 1 Ch. 392, at p. 396.
3 Supra, footnote 1.
45 Ibid.
In Bonis Parker (1860), 1 Sw. & Tr. 523, 164 E.R. 842.
6 Re Hurd, Stott v. Stott, [19411 1 All E.R. 238.
7 Wills Amendment Act, 1959 (Ont.), c. 108.
8 R.S.O. 1950, c. 426, s. 36.
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(1) Where any person, being a child or other issue or the brother or
sister of the testator to whom any real estate or personal estate is
devised or bequeathed, for any estate or interest not determinable at or
before the death of such person, dies in the lifetime of the testator either
before or after the making of the will, leaving issue and any of the issue
of such person are living at the time of the death of the testator, such
devise or bequest shall not lapse but shall take effect as if the death of
such person had happened immediately after the death of the testator,
unless a contrary intention appears by the will.
(2) This section shall apply to a devise or bequest to children or other
issue or to brothers or sisters as a class.

The 1959 Wills Amendment Act 9 purports to effect not only the
destination of the gift, which, but for this section, would have lapsed,
but to correct, where possible the ambiguities and uncertainties
which were extant in the old section 36 either by reason of, or despite
the host of learned judicial expression. The purpose of this article
will be to examine briefly the most important of the problems of
interpretation which have arisen and to examine the remedial and

other effects wrought by the new legislation. There was no intention
under the old section for the "issue" surviving the testator to benefit
from the prevention from lapse. The persons benefiting were those
whom the "child or other issue . . ." of the testator wished to

benefit, namely those named in his will or, if he died intestate, his
heirs at law.

It will be shown that the new section has the indirect

effect of benefiting the "issue" surviving the testator, but not exclusively. The meaning of the term "issue" in the phrase "leaving issue"
was the subject of the judgment in Re Hill,'0 where the testator

left property to his sister, who died in the lifetime of the testator,
leaving only grandchildren surviving the testator.

Roach J. held: 11

The question arises whether they (the grandchildren) are issue within
the meaning of the words "leaving issue" in that section. I think the
word "issue" in that phrase must be given its general extensive meaning
and includes grandchildren.
Another question which arises under the new section as it did
in the old is that of the existence of a contrary intention. It does
not appear that the contrary intention must be expressed in clear
language and any degree of contrary intention, whether expressed or
implied, would appear to be sufficient to preclude the operation of the
section. Thus in a case' 2 decided under the Manitoba Wills Act 13 a
testator left property to his sister who died during the testator's
lifetime. The testator had foreseen this possibility and had provided
in his will that in the event of a beneficiary predeceasing him "The
9 Supra, footnote 7.
10 [19431 O.W.N. 224.
11 At p. 224.
12
Be Sheardown, [19511 3 D.L.R. 323 (Man. K.B.).
-3R.S.M. 1952, c. 293, s. 30 (one of the Uniform Wills Acts).
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share due the deceased parent shall be divided among their issue."
He additionally gave to his executor power "to use the share of any
infant child of such deceased parent for its education and advancement". It was here held that the testator had shown an intention
that "issue" should be construed in the restricted sense of meaning
children only (and not remoter issue) by reason mainly of the use
of the term "infant child" as qualifying the term "issue" previously
employed, thereby showing an intention that grandchildren should
not take, which was a contrary intention in terms of Section 30 of
the Wills Act.14 The Manitoba Wills Act, Section 30 provides in
part.15
...the devise or bequest shall not lapse but shall take effect as if it
had been made directly to the persons amongst whom and in the shares
in which that person's estate would have been divisible if he had died
intestate and without debts immediately after the death of the testator.
Pursuant to this section of the Wills Act the grandchildren would
have benefited as next-of-kin, and an implied intention that they
should not take, was, as has been shown, a sufficient expression of
contrary intention. This case 16 would appear to have had no application under the old Ontario Section' 7 (though if in fact the grandchildren were to benefit a similar decision may well have been
reached). The new Ontario Section 36 is, in this respect at least,
completely in line with the Uniform Wills Act provisions.' 8 Indeed
it would seem that the "uniform" provisions have had considerable
influence upon the drafting of the new Ontario Section 36, which
provides:
Unless a contrary intention appears by the will, where a devise or bequest is made to a child, grandchild, brother or sister of the testator
who dies before the testator and leaves issue surviving the testator, the
devise or bequest does not lapse but takes effect as if it had been made
directly to the persons among whom and in the shares in which the
estate of that person would have been divisible if he had died intestate
and without debts immediately after the death of the testator.
There has been a noteworthy absence of judicial expression upon the
interpretation of the Uniform Wills legislation and perhaps this
can be taken as a prophetic guide, if only one of a negative nature,
to the future smooth working of the present Section 36.
Under the old Section 36 as under the new amended section it
is provided that the estate is divisible as if the beneficiaries named
in the will had died immediately after the death of the testator. The
problems which arose in this connection remain with us in
substance despite the amendment, and notwithstanding the changed
final destinations of the gift. The problem which has confronted the
judicial mind is simply what is the scope of the "resurrection"?
14 Ibid.

35 See also other provinces where Uniform Wills legislation is in effect,
namely,
Alberta, Saskatchewan, and New Brunswick.
16
Be Sheardown, supra, footnote 12.
37 See Re Hill, supra,footnote 10, per Roach J. at p. 225: no intention to
benefit issue surviving the testator.
18 See, supra, footnote 15.
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Should it be interpreted widely so as to revive the deceased beneficiary for all legal purposes pertaining to the administration and
distribution of the gift; or should it be afforded a narrow construction and apply only for the purpose of preventing lapse. The earlier
cases of In Bonis Parkeri 9 and Re Scott 2° were decidedly in favour
of resurrection for all purposes. However, in Re Hurd2 ' Farwell J.
stated with conviction, but apparently per incuriam, citing the above
cited authorities:
The section provides that the gift is not to lapse but is to take effect as
if the death of such person had happened immediately after the death
of the testator. If one treats those words quite literally one must assume
that the (beneficiary) survived and then died immediately after the
death of the testatrix in 1939, and the effect must be that the estate
must be administered according to the law in force at that date, namely
at the date when she is deemed to have died.

He then goes on to say:
In my judgment, however, that is not really the true effect of this sec.
tion. The effect of the section is to prevent lapsing in this particular
case, the result being that instead of the gift lapsing it becomes part
of the estate of the deceased person, and it is provided that the gift is
to go on the footing that the (beneficiary) was alive at the death of
the testatrix and was therefore a person to whom the gift could be
given. However, although she is deemed, for the purpose of malting
this gift effective, to have been living in 1939, none the less the gift
itseZf does become part of the estate of the beneficiary and, that estate
being administered in accordance with the law as it was at the true
date of the death, that is the law under which the share which she
takes by virtue of this provision, must also be administered. It is not
difficult to appreciate what position might arise if that were not the
true effect of the section. For instance, if a person dies intestate In
the lifetime of the testator, and it becomes necessary to inquire who
is the next of kin at the date of the death, and an enquiry is ordered,
and the whole matter is gone into.

.

.

. If, subsequently, that estate

becomes increased by a gift which is in favour of a person deemed to
have died after 1925, then, if I am to read Sec. 33 as meaning that the
estate is to be administered in accordance with the law as it was after
1925, a further enquiry will be necessary as to the next-of.kin of that
person on the footing that she died at the time when, in fact, she had
been long dead. The result might be that, in those circumstances, one
might have different persons-some going out and others coming Inentitled to participate in any share to which the estate became entitled
and which is saved from lapsing ....
On the whole I have come to the
conclusion that the section does not apply beyond providing for the
prevention of lapse. (Italics are mine)

The decision of Farwell J. in Re Hurd was embodied in the Law of
'Ontario in Re Branchfower22 where the question again arose as to
whether those entitled to take on the death of the testator were
those entitled to take at the date of resurrection, or those entitled
at the actual date of death of the beneficiary; or, more succinctly,
did the provisions of Sec. 36(1) merely operate to prevent lapse and
go no further. Hogg J. was in the happy position of being able to
choose between authorities. He rejected the wide view,2 3 and adopted
19 (1860), 1 Sw. & Tr. 523, 164 E.R. 842.
2o

21
22
23

[1901] 1 K.B. 228 and 240.
[1941] 1 All E.R. 238, at p. 240.
[1945] 4 D.L.R. 559 (Ont. High Ct.).

In Bonis Parker,supra, footnote 19.
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the reasoning of Farwell J.24 in applying the law in force at the
actual date of death of the beneficiary in determining the distribution of the gift saved from lapse. It would appear from the reasoning of Farwell J. that he postulated reasons which fitted his decision,
rather than using reasoning to arrive at a decision, this being evidenced, the writer submits, by his implications that despite the
clarity of the section any other interpretation would lead to an
absurdity. It will be noted, however, that part of his reasoning, at
least, is based upon the fact that "the gift itself does become part
of the estate of the beneficiary". 25 It is clear that the new Ontario
section precludes the gift from forming part of the estate of the
beneficiary, for the gift passes directly from the testator to the
next-of-kin of the beneficiary. The controversy between the "wider"
and "narrower" points of view has been re-opened, when it was hoped
that the new section itself would have supplied the answer.
One of the ensuing complications of the controversy between
the "wider" and "narrower" views has found expression in the estate
tax and succession duty fields. In Re Scott2 the gift saved from
lapse was, in pursuance of the "wider" view, held to be subject to
U.K. estate duty both in the estate of the testator and that of the
beneficiary. The "narrower" view, however, was adopted in Re
Hilder27 wherein Judson J. sought to distinguish Re Scott on the
grounds (inter alia) that Re Scott involved estate duty which taxed
property passing on the death, whereas the statute under consideration in Re Hilder taxed a "succession" which at the actual date of
death was valueless. It is hoped that the problem of double succession
cannot again arise under the new Sec. 36 for, in the words of Roach
J.,28 "I wish to point out that this problem cannot arise in those provinces which have followed the wording suggested in the draft Uniform
Wills Act ....
" We have already noted the similarity of the "Uniform" Acts to the new Ontario Section.
Having examined briefly the difficulties and anomalies of the
old law, it now remains to perform the sometimes rewarding, but
more often thankless, task of foreseeing the effect of the new enactment.
We have seen that under the old Section 36(1) the gift saved
from lapsing was one which was made to any person "being a child
or other issue, or brother or sister of the testator". The use of the
two terms "child" and "other issue" indicate that all issue, no matter
how remote, were embraced.2
The new section, if only for purposes of clarity, has confined the
application of this part to a child, grandchild, brother and sister. It
24

Re Hurd, supra, footnote 21.

25
Ibid., at p. 240.
26

Supra, footnote 20.
Toronto General Trusts v. M.. .R, [1958] S.C.R. 499.
28
Ibid., at p. 502.
29
Wytth v). Blackburn (1749), 1 Ves. Sen. 196, 27 E.R. 979.
27
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is abundantly clear that the section no longer applies to remoter
issue, 30 and in achieving such clarity the draftsmen are to be lauded
indeed.
A further change from the old section is found in the omission
from the new of the restriction limiting the devise or bequest to
".... any estate or interest not determinable at or before the death
(of the beneficiary) . . ." It is noteworthy that the word "determinable" and not "determined" is used, thus no interest determinable
during the lifetime of the beneficiary, whether determined or not,
would have been saved from lapse. Thus, for example, an interest
pur autre vie, being capable of determination during the lifetime of
the beneficiary, would have lapsed despite the old section 36(1). The
omission of any restrictive limitation upon the nature of the gift in
the new Section 36 means that any interest whatsoever may be saved
from lapse thereunder. The removal of this limitation is again a
step away from uncertainty towards clarity.
The term "issue" in the phrase "leaves issue" in the new section
corresponds to its meaning in the phrase "leaving issue" in the
old, and that such term embraces remote issue seems to be clearly
31
established.
The appearance of a contrary intention remains, as before,
dependent upon the construction of the will itself; 32 the transposition of this limiting clause from its previous resting place at the end
of sub-section (1) of Sec. 36 to the beginning in the new Sec. 36
having no apparent effect upon its meaning.
A brief comment is called for on the omission from the amended
Sec. 36 of what was sub-section (2) in the old section. It was there
provided expressly that the section applied to prevent the lapse of
class gifts. In the absence of such provision the judgment of Middleton J. in Re Cerswe133 would seem to retain its efficacy in construing
34
the new section. He states:
Section 37 (now Sec. 36) in its original form has frequently been construed and has uniformly been held to have no application to a gift to
a class, as in its terms it is limited to a gift to individuals.
The gift in the new section 36 must be to "a child, grandchild,
brother or sister"-gifts to individuals, and class gifts fall out of the
ambit of this part of the Wills Act to be dealt with once more in
terms of the general law.
Of course the most marked change brought about by the 1959
amendment is that providing for the destination of the gift saved
from lapse. We have seen that under the old section the gift formed
part of the estate of the named beneficiary for the purpose of its
distribution, and passed to those persons entitled (as at the actual
30 Expressio unius est excZlusio alterius rule applied.
Hill, [19431 O.W.N. 224.
- e Sheardoum, [1951] 3 D.L.R. 323 (Man. K.B.).

31

3 2 RBe
34

Ibid., at p. 164.
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date of death) to share in the estate. We have also seen that it
was only for the purpose of determining destination that the gift
entered the estate of the beneficiary, which estate acted as a conduit
pipe for passage of the gift to those eventually entitled. 36 The gift
was therefore capable of distribution or disbursement not only to
the successors to the beneficiary but also to his creditors.3 7
The new section, as we have seen, circumvents the problem by
providing that the gift passes ". . as if it had been made directly
to the persons among whom, and in the shares in which the estate
of that person (and the beneficiary) would have been divisible if he
had died intestate and without debts immediately after the death of
the testator".
This means that none of the problems concomitant with the
gift forming part of the estate can now arise.
The gift is not subject to the debts of the beneficiary's estate,
nor can double succession or estate duties be imposed, yet, as shown
in the examination of Re Hurd, it was for the reason that the gift
formed part of the estate of the beneficiary that the law to be applied
in distributing the gift was that which was in effect at the actual
date of death of the beneficiary. The new section removes the basis
for this decision without providing a substitute guide as to the law
to be applied. In Re Hurd, Farwell J. commented that upon a literal
construction of the section the law at the date of statutory death
would apply. This comment is equally applicable to the new section.
The difficulties envisaged by Farwell J. in the application of such a
construction still remain, but it would again require an exercise in
legal gymnastics to apply other than the obvious and apparent literal
meaning of the new section; namely, that the law to be applied in
affecting distribution of the gift, is that in effect at the date of the
statutory death and such distribution is to be made to those persons
entitled on intestacy, ignoring debts, at such date. The hook upon
which Farwell J. hung his judicial hat having been removed, a legal
contortionist rather than a gymnast will be required to change the
literal and obvious meaning of the new section.

35
36

Be Hurd, Be Branchlfower, supra, footnotes 21 and 22 respectively.
Re Hilder, Toronto General Trusts v. M.N.J?., supra, footnote 27.
37 Be Pearson,Smitk v. Pearson,[1920] 1 Ch. 247.

